In the Defence of Parliamentary Autonomy – 35 Years of Practice by the Hungarian Constitutional Court in the Field of Parliamentary Law¹

by | Cikkrészlet

with Nincs hozzászólás
Authors:
Csaba Erdős associate professor, Széchenyi István University, Faculty of Law and Political Sciences; chief counsellor, Constitutional Court of Hungary
Viktória Verebélyi assistant lecturer, Széchenyi István University, Faculty of Law and Political Sciences; law associate, Constitutional Court of Hungary

Abstract

This study, through an examination of thirty-five years of case law, demonstrates that the Hungarian Constitutional Court intervenes in internal parliamentary affairs only in instances of clear and direct constitutional violations. The analysis then places this approach in a comparative perspective by showing that the European Court of Human Rights has increasingly recognized parliamentary autonomy when assessing disciplinary sanctions imposed on members of parliament.

Keywords: parliamentary autonomy, Hungarian Constitutional Court, European Court of Human Rights, self-regulation, disciplinary law

I. Introduction

One of the key issues in constitutional systems is the division of powers, a particularly difficult question being that of external control – exercisable by another branch of power – over the internal functioning of independent branches of power. This is such a difficult question that there is hardly a ‘single correct answer’,[2] as it is necessary to ensure both the independence of the branch of power in question and the principle that public power should not be exercised without restriction. The challenges of reconciling these two conflicting requirements can be found in relation to the legal status of judges, but they also arise as a serious issue in connection with the functioning of parliaments. The literature traditionally subsumes the latter under the concept of parliamentary autonomy, contrasting it with the requirement of external review.[3] Based on this, we can distinguish between trends that support and weaken parliamentary autonomy and those that emphasise the importance of constitutional control, and we can place the decisions of the constitutional court and the supreme court on these issues on a scale marked by these extreme values.

The aim of this study is to review which of these categories the Hungarian Constitutional Court can be classified into based on its thirty-five years of practice, and whether there have been any deviations in its jurisprudence. The study also focuses on how the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter: ECtHR), which has a significant impact on Hungarian public law issues, views the desirable degree of parliamentary autonomy. A comparison of the relevant practices of the two courts is particularly justified and topical given that the ECtHR has dealt with Hungarian parliamentary law in several cases, most recently in Csárdi and Others v. Hungary[4]. This has provided a relatively accurate overview of the parallels and differences between the practices of the two courts.

Ön itt egy cikkrészletet talál. A teljes írást az Alkotmánybírósági Szemle nyomtatott változatában olvashatja el. Előfizetni a folyóiratra itt tud.

[1] This research was carried out using the European Constitutional Communication Network (ECCN) database, within the framework of the research project of the Comparative Constitutional Law Research Group at the National University of Public Service.

[2] See Hart and Dworkin’s debate on possible ways of deciding difficult legal questions. Summary: Takács Péter: Moderate legal positivism – H. L. A. Hart’s theory. Napvilág, 2004. 104.

[3] See Erdős Csaba: Parlamenti autonómia. Gondolat, 2016.

[4] Csárdi and Others v. Hungary App no. 38708/19 and 3 others (ECtHR, 30 September 2025).